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This paper examines whether AFDC/TANF asset tests affect the asset holdings of low-educated 
single mothers, exploiting variation in asset limits and exemptions across states and over time.  
There are important reasons to examine vehicle assets in this context. For example, vehicles 
make up a very significant share of total wealth for poor families, and the variation in vehicle 
exemptions over time and across states far exceeds the variation in asset limits.  Consistent with 
other recent research, I find little evidence that asset limits have an effect on the amount of 
liquid assets that single mothers hold.  However, I find evidence that vehicle exemptions do 
have an important effect on vehicle assets. The findings suggest that moving from a $1500 
vehicle exemption to a full vehicle exemption increases the probability of owning a car by 20 
percentage points for low-educated single mothers relative to a comparison group.  Also, the 
results indicate that single mothers are not substituting vehicle equity for liquid assets in 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The saving behavior of poor families has attracted the attention of both researchers and 
policy makers. Several studies have shown that poor families tend to have very few assets (Carney 
and Gale 2001; Ziliak 2003). Given that most of these families have limited access to formal credit 
markets (Sullivan 2005), low saving rates make it difficult for these families to invest in education, 
own a home, or make other significant investments in physical or human capital. Also, without a 
buffer of saving, poor families are not self-insured against negative income shocks, and these 
families may consequently become more dependent on public transfer programs. Some researchers 
have suggested that low saving rates among the poor limit economic mobility, exacerbating the 
cycle of poverty (Sherraden 1991).  
Previous research has shown that, in theory, transfer programs can partly explain why 
saving rates are low among the poor (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995). These programs can 
discourage saving, not only because they provide a consumption floor, but also because they are 
means tested—eligibility requires a recipient’s income and assets to fall below specified thresholds.  
This paper examines whether the AFDC/TANF asset thresholds affect the asset holdings of single 
mother families.1  Many states implemented significant changes in their asset tests during the 
1990s, resulting in an increase in both the limits on total assets and the exemptions for vehicle 
equity. Using nationally representative micro-data, I examine how this variation in eligibility rules 
across states and over time affects vehicle and liquid asset holdings for low-educated single 
mothers—a group with significant exposure to the welfare program.  
There are important reasons to focus on vehicle assets within the context of a study of the 
saving behavior of the poor.  Recent policy changes for vehicle exemptions far exceed the changes 
for asset limits.  These changes may affect not only vehicle asset holdings, but also overall asset 
                                                          
1 With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 




allocation.  Also, vehicles are the single largest component of wealth for low-educated single 
mother families.  While vehicles are somewhat illiquid, researchers have argued that durable goods 
are an important saving mechanism for families with limited exposure to financial institutions.  In 
addition, vehicles are an important consumption good, particularly for welfare recipients 
transitioning into the labor force. Nevertheless, very little research has addressed the effects of asset 
restrictions on vehicle assets. 
Consistent with other recent studies, I find little evidence that asset limits have an effect on 
the amount of liquid assets that single mothers hold. However, my results show that vehicle 
exemptions do have an important effect on vehicle assets. The findings suggest that moving from a 
$1500 vehicle exemption to a full vehicle exemption increases the probability of owning a car by 
20 percentage points for low-educated single mothers relative to a comparison group.  Additional 
analysis indicates that single mothers are not substituting vehicle equity for liquid assets in response 
to more relaxed restrictions on vehicles—increases in vehicle equity result in increases in total 
wealth. 
In the following section I discuss the relationship between asset restrictions and wealth 
holdings.  I also summarize the relevant policy reforms; provide additional motivation for why 
vehicle assets are an interesting outcome to examine in this context; and review the empirical 
literature investigating the effects of asset restrictions. Section 3 describes the data from the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) used in the analysis, and outlines the methodology. 
Results are presented in Section 4, and conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
2.  Background 
Asset tests under the AFDC/TANF program typically apply to all assets except for owner-
occupied housing equity and some fraction of the equity value of a vehicle.2  For example, in a state 
                                                          
2 Many states exclude other assets such as jewelry and burial plots. Traditionally, states have assessed the 
equity value of the vehicle (market value less vehicle debt) for the purposes of the asset test.  (See notes to 
Table 1).  
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with a $1000 asset limit and a $1500 vehicle exemption, an individual with $250 in liquid assets 
and $2000 of equity in a vehicle satisfies the state’s asset test ($250 + ($2000 - $1500) < $1000). 
However, an individual with $750 in a checking account and $2000 in vehicle equity will not 
satisfy the state’s asset test. 
Asset tests of eligibility for public transfer programs, in theory, will discourage families 
that participate in these transfer programs from holding assets. Likewise, with income uncertainty, 
asset restrictions will also discourage non-participants with a strong likelihood of participation in 
these transfer programs from accumulating wealth.  Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) show that 
households with low permanent incomes can increase expected lifetime utility by maintaining low 
levels of assets, because holding assets can result in ineligibility for public transfers.  This implies 
that asset tests may discourage saving for families that see welfare benefits as a viable alternative 
source of income.  Because some assets are exempt from the tests, the implicit tax rate can vary 
across asset type.  Thus, asset tests may also affect asset allocation. In addition, transfer programs 
such as AFDC/TANF may affect saving even in absence of an asset test by providing a 
consumption floor, reducing the need for precautionary saving.3 
 Although asset restrictions may discourage the permanent income poor from accumulating 
assets, the effect of asset limits and exemptions may be different for other households. Relaxing 
these restrictions, for example, will make transfer programs more attractive to some households that 
previously had not considered participating due to strict asset tests—in particular, households 
whose asset holdings are well above the old limits, but are relatively close to the new limits. These 
households have an incentive to respond to the increased limit by reducing asset holdings in order 
to maintain the option of participating in these transfer programs.  By contrast, there are two groups 
                                                          
3 In addition to the effect of public transfers, there are many other hypotheses for why saving rates are 
particularly low for this group. For example, as implied by a full consumption insurance model, poor families 
have less incentive to save for precautionary reasons if they insure by transferring assets between families. 
See Cochrane (1991) or Townsend (1994) for a discussion of full consumption insurance. Also, poor families 
might discount future consumption differently than other families (Lawrance 1991; Angeletos et al. 2001). In 
addition, these families may exhibit less life-cycle saving due to the relatively high replacement rates of 
Social Security for low-income groups. 
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of households that are not likely to exhibit any behavioral response to the presence of asset 
restrictions in public transfer programs: a) wealthy or high permanent income households and b) 
households with very few assets and very low permanent incomes. For the former, these restrictions 
are irrelevant because the probability of program participation is extremely low, while for the latter, 
the asset restrictions are not likely to be binding.  
A. Policy Changes 
Asset limits and vehicle exemptions under AFDC/TANF have varied over time and across 
states.  These rules have undergone two periods of major reform during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
first was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA 81), which made asset limits 
fairly uniform across states, and imposed dramatic reductions in the amount of vehicle equity that 
could be exempt from the asset test. OBRA 81 specified a maximum AFDC asset limit of $1000, 
although states could set a lower limit. OBRA 81 also imposed greater restrictions on vehicle 
equity. Prior to 1981, 32 states allowed the full value of one vehicle to be exempt from the AFDC 
asset test. OBRA 81 set a $1500 maximum for this exemption.4  
Between 1982 and 1992 asset restrictions for the AFDC/TANF program remained virtually 
unchanged in nominal terms. States changed eligibility rules between 1992 and 1996 through 
welfare waivers—applications to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to change 
certain program requirements. As shown in Table 1, during this waiver period states moderately 
relaxed asset limits, but dramatically relaxed restrictions on vehicle equity. Twelve states relaxed 
asset limits, but even the most generous limits remained at or below $5000 for a single recipient. 
During this same period, nearly half of the states offered more generous vehicle exemptions, with 
seven of these states exempting the full value of at least one vehicle. Changes in limits and 
exemptions continued after the passage of PRWORA in 1996.  By 1999, seven states still had asset 
limits of $1000, while twenty-one states had exempted the full value of a vehicle.   
                                                          
4 Other changes resulting from OBRA 81 include the exemption of equity in owner-occupied homes from 
asset tests.  See Powers (1998) for more details. 
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At the same time that states changed asset limits and exemptions, they also changed other 
features of the AFDC program. Between 1992 and 1996, many states applied for HHS waivers to 
impose work requirements, time limits, or family caps.  In addition, many states lowered the 
effective tax rate that AFDC placed on labor income. In 1996, PRWORA replaced the AFDC 
program with state administered TANF block grants. With PRWORA came mandated work 
requirements and time limits and new stipulations for minor parents.  Besides these requirements, 
PRWORA gave states broad authority to restructure the nature of their welfare programs.  See 
Blank (2002) or Grogger and Karoly (2005) for more details on these changes. 
B. Vehicles                      
There are compelling reasons to examine vehicle assets in addition to liquid assets in the 
context of a study of the effects of welfare policy on saving. First, as discussed in Section 2A, the 
variation in vehicle exemptions far exceeds the variation in the limits on total assets. In the 1990s 
most states significantly relaxed the constraint on vehicle equity, so that by 1999 nearly half of all 
states offered a full exemption for at least one vehicle. At this same time, only seven states had 
relaxed their asset limits by more than $2000 between 1992 and 1999 (Table 1).   
Another important reason to examine vehicle assets is that families with a high probability 
of participating in welfare are more likely to have vehicle equity than any other type of asset. As 
shown in Figure 1, more than 40 percent of all single mothers without a high school degree have 
some vehicle equity. This is significantly higher than the twenty-two percent that have money in a 
checking or savings account. These families hold very little in other forms of assets. Thus, vehicles 
account for a very large share of the total asset portfolio for low-educated single mother families. 
As evident in Figure 3, vehicles account for sixty-seven percent of non-housing assets for single 
mothers without a high school degree. This is a much greater fraction than is evident for a sample 
that includes those with a high school degree (Figure 2).  
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It is also important to look at vehicle assets in addition to liquid assets because the 
AFDC/TANF eligibility rules treat these assets differently.  Due to vehicle exemptions, the implicit 
tax rate is lower for vehicle assets than for liquid assets. Thus, vehicle exemptions may not only 
affect the level of asset holdings, but they may also distort asset allocation, encouraging families to 
substitute vehicle equity for other types of assets. 
There are several reasons why policy makers who are concerned about the saving behavior 
of the poor might be less interested in changes in vehicle assets than changes in other assets such as 
housing or financial wealth. Vehicle assets are less likely than other assets to hold their value or 
appreciate. Also, vehicle assets are less liquid than other forms of saving, making them less 
effective as a means of buffering against negative income shocks. Nevertheless, durable goods such 
as vehicles can be an important saving mechanism for poor households.  Browning and Crossley 
(2001) argue that durable goods provide an important source of consumption smoothing for low-
income households. For example, a household may purchase durables when transitory income is 
high while postponing purchases of durables during income shortfalls, effectively smoothing 
consumption over uncertain income steams. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2004) show that it 
is optimal household behavior to accumulate durables early in the life-cycle as these durables 
provide both consumption flows and collateral for insurance against variable income. Poor 
households may choose to save through durables simply because they have limited access to 
checking or savings accounts at financial institutions (Caskey 1994). 
The effect of welfare policy on vehicle ownership also has important implications for the 
well-being of single mother families because vehicles may be a particularly important consumption 
good for welfare recipients transitioning into the labor force. Some researchers have argued that 
vehicles are an important outcome to examine because concerns about transportation for poor 
families have risen in the wake of recent reforms to welfare policy that have placed significant 
emphasis on work.  Ong and Blumenberg (1998) suggest that transportation is a major obstacle to 
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sustainable employment for former welfare recipients. Other research finds positive effects of car 
ownership on both employment and hours of work (Raphael and Rice 2002; Bansak, Mattson, and 
Rice 2004). These effects are disproportionately large for workers that are spatially isolated from 
employment opportunities (Raphael and Stoll 2001).  As shown in the following section, most 
working single mothers use their own car to commute to work. 
C.  Previous Empirical Work 
Two empirical studies examine the effect of asset restrictions under the AFDC/TANF 
program on the saving behavior of the poor: Powers (1998) and Hurst and Ziliak (Forthcoming).5 
Powers (1998) considers how total net wealth, which includes housing equity but excludes vehicle 
equity, responds to the changes in the asset limit mandated by OBRA 81. She examines a small 
sample of single mothers (N=229) from the 1979 and 1984 waves of the National Longitudinal 
Survey-Young Women (NLS-YW), identifying the policy effect by exploiting cross-state variation 
in the change in the asset limit between 1978 and 1983. She finds a fairly large effect: a $1 increase 
in the asset limit results in 25 cents of additional saving for households headed by a single mother 
between the ages of 24 and 34 in the base year.  
Due to data limitations, Powers does not include vehicle equity in her measure of 
household assets. As explained in the previous subsection, excluding vehicle assets is particularly 
problematic for an analysis of the saving behavior of poor households. Also, due to other 
limitations in the data, the findings in Powers (1998) are not likely to be representative of the 
population of all single mothers. The NLS-YW originated in 1968 with a sample of women aged 14 
to 24. Thus, the sample of single mothers in Powers (1998) is limited to women between the ages of 
24 and 34 at the base year of her study and these women are at least 29 years old in the post-OBRA 
81 wave. This excludes a substantial portion of single mothers who are exposed to these transfer 
                                                          
5 Other studies have analyzed the effects of asset restrictions for different programs. For example, Gruber and 
Yelowitz (1999) examine the effect of asset restrictions under the Medicaid program. They show that 
Medicaid eligibility has a large negative effect on household wealth. Neumark and Powers (1998) also find 
significant effects of the asset tests imposed under SSI on the saving behavior of an elderly sample. See 
Orszag  (2001) for a summary of the empirical literature on the effects of asset restrictions. 
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programs. This may imply that the findings overstate the responsiveness of saving to asset 
restrictions for younger single mothers for whom the restrictions may not be binding because these 
younger mothers are much less likely to have accumulated assets. 
 Hurst and Ziliak study the more recent reforms to asset restrictions under AFDC/TANF that 
were implemented either through waivers or PRWORA. Like Powers, they estimate how saving 
behavior responds to cross-state variation in changes in the asset rules. Using the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides asset data for the same households in 1994 and 2001, 
they examine how asset holdings for single mother households change over this seven-year period. 
Unlike Powers’ findings, Hurst and Ziliak (Forthcoming) conclude that changes in asset restrictions 
have no measurable effect on changes in liquid assets for single mother families. The authors argue 
that one explanation for this finding is that a substantial fraction of these households have very few 
assets, and therefore the constraint on assets is not binding. They show that, for a sample of single 
mothers without a college degree, more than 80 percent have liquid wealth below the state-
mandated limit of $1000. However, this argument might be less applicable to constraints on vehicle 
equity, because limits on vehicle assets may be more likely to bind for this sample.  Hurst and 
Ziliak also show that, conditional on not owning a vehicle in 1994, every $1000 increase in the 
asset limit increases the probability of owning a vehicle in 2001 by 13 percentage points.  They do 
not consider the effect of vehicle exemptions on vehicle ownership, and they find no effect of asset 
limits or vehicle exemptions on the probability of having a positive change in vehicle equity over 
their seven-year period.  
My paper contributes to the existing literature in several important ways. First, unlike 
previous studies, I present detailed evidence on changes in vehicle assets, which are a critical 
component of saving for single mother families. Moreover, recent policy changes may be 
particularly important for vehicle equity. Second, the empirical literature investigating the effects of 
asset limits has reached little consensus. This study provides additional empirical evidence for this 
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debate; my results for liquid assets confirm the findings of Hurst and Ziliak using a different 
dataset—a more generous limit on assets does not increase liquid asset holdings. Third, in addition 
to examining the effects of policy changes that occurred after PRWORA, I also present evidence on 
the effect of policy changes that occurred during the pre-RRWORA waiver period.  It is important 
to examine the waiver period in isolation because rules governing state welfare programs became 
highly idiosyncratic post-PRWORA, making it very difficult to characterize the nature of program 
changes using a few simple parameters. Fourth, I use a much larger dataset that provides more than 
five times as many observations as previous studies.  The larger sample enables me to more 
precisely estimate the effects of recent policy changes by better targeting my analysis on a narrowly 
defined demographic group with significant exposure to welfare. I focus on single mothers with less 
than a high school degree, while previous research has looked at single mothers with less than a 
college degree. Single mothers without a high school degree are much more likely to participate in 
welfare. In the early 1990s 72 percent of these single mothers received welfare during the previous 
year, as compared to 42 percent for single mothers without a college degree.  By 1998, these 
participation rates had fallen to 50 percent and 29 percent respectively.6  
3.  Data and Methodology 
A.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis draws on data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP).  The SIPP provides data for a stratified sample representative of the U.S. civilian 
noninstitutionalized population.  Respondents provide demographic and economic information over 
the course of several years at four-month intervals. Within each panel, the survey will periodically 
include an asset and liability topical module which collects detailed wealth information.  
Respondents report the make, model, and year for all vehicles.  From these data the SIPP calculates 
                                                          
6 These participation rates are based on the author’s calculations using adjusted data from the March Current 
Population Survey. Because welfare receipt is significantly underreported in the March CPS, I adjust the 
reported numbers using administrative data reported in Bavier (1999).  
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a market value for each car.  Other asset and liability questions cover liquid assets such as checking 
and savings accounts, U.S. savings bonds, private equity investments, and other financial 
investments, as well as real estate wealth, business equity, and assets in retirement accounts.  
Additional information is also provided for liabilities including vehicle loans, mortgage loans and 
unsecured debt.  Unfortunately, the SIPP does not ask households to report the amount of cash held 
outside of financial institutions. However, data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 
which does ask about cash assets, suggest that cash holdings are a small fraction of asset holdings, 
even for poor families.7  
I pool data from the 1992, 1993, and 1996 Panels of the SIPP. In the 1992 Panel, 
respondents report asset information in the fourth wave (early in 1993) and again one year later in 
the seventh wave.  Similarly, in the 1993 Panel respondents report asset information in the fourth 
wave (early in 1994) and again one year later.  In the 1996 Panel, respondents are asked about their 
stock of assets and liabilities four times over the duration of the panel at one year intervals. Assets 
are first reported in the third wave which starts at the end of 1996.   
Data on changes in various AFDC/TANF program rules over time and across states are 
gathered from four sources: Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001); U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Ways and Means (Various Years); HHS (Various Years); and Urban Institute 
(2002). Under the New Federalism project the Urban Institute has compiled data dating back to 
1996 on asset limits and vehicle exemption levels as well as many other program parameters for 
each state.  
To concentrate on a group of families that is likely to have significant exposure to the 
AFDC/TANF program, the analysis that follows focuses on families headed by single mothers 
without a high school degree. By looking at low-educated single mothers I focus on the at-risk 
population that is most likely to be affected by reforms in AFDC/TANF asset restrictions.  
                                                          
7 This is based on the author’s calculations using the 1998 SCF.  
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Table 2 provides a preliminary look at samples of low-educated single women between the 
ages of 18 and 54 from the SIPP for the years 1992 through 1999. I present descriptive information 
for single mothers and a comparison group of single women without children—a group which is 
much less likely to be affected by recent changes to welfare policy. Both groups of women, 
however, experience similar economic outcomes, and have similar wages—particularly when one 
conditions on educational attainment (Meyer and Sullivan 2004).  The SIPP data for these years 
include 5,153 single mothers with a high school degree or less, 1,837 of which did not finish high 
school, and 3,148 single women without children, 792 of which did not finish high school.8  As 
shown in Table 2, there are some differences across these two groups. Single mothers (Columns 1 
and 2) are younger, less educated, and more likely to be minority than the comparison group of 
single women without children (Columns 3 and 4).  Also, single women without children are more 
likely to own a car and they are wealthier than single mothers. 
The evidence on asset holdings in Table 2 suggests that restrictions on vehicle equity are 
much more likely to bind than restrictions on liquid assets.  Forty-three percent of all single mothers 
without a high school degree own an automobile (Column 1). For a sample of those with a high 
school degree or less, 58 percent own cars (Column 2). The majority of these women with a job 
drive their own vehicle to work.  The median equity value of a single car (not reported) is $1825 for 
single women with a high school degree or less and $1500 for those without a high school degree. 
Average vehicle equity for low-educated single mothers far exceeds the average value of liquid 
assets.  More than a quarter of all single mothers with a high school degree or less, and nearly half 
of those with cars, have vehicle equity greater than $2500 in real terms, which alone would make 
them ineligible for AFDC under the pre-waiver rules.9 By contrast, less than fifteen percent of these 
low-educated single mothers have liquid assets that exceed the restriction on liquid assets. 
                                                          
8 I delete observations that are missing the state of residence. I can uniquely identify the state of residence for 
forty-five separate states as well as the District of Columbia.  
9 All dollar figures in the analysis are converted to constant 1996 dollars using the CPI-U. 
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Moreover, seventy-five percent of all low-educated single mothers, and more than eighty-five 
percent of those without a high school degree, have liquid assets valued at less than half of the pre-
waiver asset limit.  
Table 3 examines changes in asset holdings for single mothers before and after states 
change vehicle exemptions, and compares these trends to those for single women without children.  
The “Pre Exemption Change” sample includes single women living in state-years where the 
nominal vehicle exemption is still $1500.  The “Post Exemption Change” sample includes single 
women living in state-years where the vehicle exemption is greater than $1500.  The results show 
that vehicle ownership for single mothers increases both in absolute and relative terms after states 
relax vehicle exemptions. Vehicle ownership for single mothers without a high school degree 
increases by 10.5 percentage points after these limits are relaxed. The increase for single mothers 
with a high school degree or less is 7.1 percentage points. By contrast, vehicle ownership for single 
women without children remains virtually unchanged.  For single mothers without a high school 
degree, vehicle ownership increases by 8.4 percentage points relative to the comparison group.  
The value of vehicle assets also increases for single mothers.  For those without a high 
school degree vehicle equity increases in absolute terms by 32.5 percent, although most of this 
increase is due to greater vehicle ownership rather than increased value conditional on ownership. 
There is some evidence that vehicle equity for this group increases in relative terms as well, by 22 
percentage points, but this change is not statistically significant. Traditionally, most states have 
applied the equity value of the vehicle against the asset test.  By focusing on equity value states 
with strict limits on vehicle assets may not only discourage vehicle ownership, but also provide an 
incentive for potential welfare recipients to accumulate vehicle debt. However, Table 3 shows that 
the market value of vehicles for low-educated single mothers increases by more than equity value 
both in absolute and relative terms, indicating that vehicle debt actually increases after vehicle 
exemptions become more generous.  Debt as a fraction of vehicle value (not reported) increases for 
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low-educated single mothers that own cars both in absolute terms and relative to the comparison 
group.  During this period, 38 percent of low-educated single mothers with cars have some vehicle 
debt, and 9 percent have zero or negative vehicle equity.  There is also some evidence that liquid 
assets increase for the lowest educated women, but this change is not statistically significant and 
much of this increase is driven by a drop in liquid assets for the comparison group.   
These differences in trends of vehicle assets need not be driven by changes in the vehicle 
exemption.  The employment rate of single mothers increased sharply after 1993 in absolute terms 
and relative to comparison groups (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).  By 1999 the employment rate of 
single mothers was more than 10 percentage points higher than it was in 1992. While reforms to 
welfare policy almost surely contributed to the rise in relative employment rates, research has 
shown that other policy changes played a major role.10  If increased employment generates an 
increase in demand for vehicles as a means for transportation to work, then changes in relative 
employment rates could explain why vehicle ownership rises faster for single mothers than for 
single women without children. Although the difference in vehicle ownership rates in Table 3 may 
be driven by changes in employment rates across these groups of women, this evidence still 
suggests that policy changes did have an important effect on vehicle ownership rates for single 
mothers.  The analysis that follows will isolate the effect of changes in asset limits and exemptions 
from other policy changes and mitigating factors that are likely to affect the vehicle ownership rates 
of single mothers.  
B.  Methodology  
The empirical methodology exploits the significant variation in asset restrictions over time 
and across states to estimate the effects of changes in these asset restrictions on asset holdings for 
                                                          
10 Meyer and Rosenbaum find that the EITC is responsible for a large share of employment increases through 
1996, with a smaller, but still important role for welfare benefit cuts and changes in welfare programs under 
waivers.  Ellwood (2000) attributes recent employment increases to welfare reform, the EITC, and 
improvements in macroeconomic conditions. 
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the period from 1992 through 1999. For a sample of low-educated single mothers I estimate the 
following model: 
(1)  Vist = β1Exemptionst + β2(Exemptionst * Exemption Valuest) + β3Asset Limitst  
       + β4(Asset Limitst * Benefitist) + β5Benefitist + β6Xist + β7Zst + γs + τt + εist.      
where Vist is an outcome for family i in state s in year t. In the analysis that follows, Vist represents 
an indicator for whether a family owns a vehicle or a measure of vehicle or liquid assets or non-
housing wealth. Exemptionst is an indicator for whether state s has a limit on vehicles in year t (1 = 
no full exemption, 0 = full vehicle exemption), Exemption Valuest is the real dollar value of the 
exemption given the state does not exempt the full value of a vehicle, and Asset Limitst is the real 
value of the restriction on total assets for eligibility for AFDC/TANF. Xist is a vector of 
demographic variables including family size, number of kids, whether the family lives in a rural 
area, and the race, education, and a cubic in age of the single mother. Zst is a vector of time-varying 
state characteristics including the average manufacturing wages in a state, the quarterly state-level 
unemployment rate, and indicators for other state welfare policies. γs is a time-invariant state effect 
that reflects unobservable heterogeneity across states, while τt is a time effect that reflects aggregate 
trends such as trends in vehicle ownership. In all of the results that follow, I report 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are assumed to be independent across states, but 
not across individuals within a state.  
To capture differences in the value of participating in welfare across states and over time, I 
include in the model a measure of the maximum benefit in a state for a given family size (Benefitist), 
as well as an interaction of the maximum benefit with the value of the asset limit. The interaction 
term allows the effect of the asset limit to differ across states depending on welfare generosity.11  If 
more generous asset limits encourage saving particularly in states with higher welfare benefits, then 
one would expect (β4) to be positive.  The maximum benefit is adjusted to account for the 
                                                          
11 I also estimated models that include an interaction of the vehicle limit and welfare generosity.  These 
models yield results very similar to those reported in Section 4. 
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difference in the cost of living across states using the cost of living index from Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (2001). This measure of real benefits allows me to express the attractiveness of welfare 
on a common scale across states and over time.  
At the same time that asset restrictions changed as a result of waivers, states also 
restructured other program rules, affecting the probability that a family participates in 
AFDC/TANF.  For example, during the 1990s many states imposed work requirements and time 
limits, which placed a lifetime limit on welfare receipt.  These other changes in welfare policy may 
also affect saving behavior.  For example, work requirements may increase precautionary motives 
to save directly, or increase saving through their effect on earnings.  Similarly, a time limit may 
reduce the probability of participating in welfare or simply lower the option value of welfare, 
increasing the incentive to save for precautionary reasons.  To capture other changes in state 
policies, I include in the analysis indicators for other major changes to state welfare rules. All 
baseline specifications include an indicator for whether the state has implemented a time limit and 
an indicator for whether the state has terminated an AFDC case under waiver rules.  These 
measures follow Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001).  In Section 4C other policies are considered.  
It is important to note that the passage of PRWORA in 1996 allowed states to dramatically 
change the nature of their welfare programs, resulting in highly idiosyncratic state programs post-
PRWORA.  This is a major obstacle for cross-state studies of welfare reform, as it is very difficult 
to characterize the nature of program changes using a few simple parameters (Ellwood 2000).  
Furthermore, the effect of asset restrictions on saving will certainly depend on the probability of 
being on welfare, and this probability changed dramatically after 1996—caseloads fell by more 
than forty percent between 1996 and 1999 (Meyer and Sullivan 2004). For this reason, in Section 4 
I also examine the effects of policy changes that occurred prior to the passage of PRWORA. 
Estimates from Equation (1) may be vulnerable to omitted variable bias if states that offer 
higher benefits or more generous asset restrictions differ from other states in ways that are 
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important for determining vehicle ownership or saving decisions. For example, general attitudes 
towards saving may be different across states and these attitudes may be correlated with welfare 
policies. To address this, all specifications include state fixed-effects (γs) which capture time-
invariant characteristics of the state. I also control for some observable, time-varying characteristics 
of the state such as average manufacturing wages in a state and the quarterly state-level 
unemployment rate.12  
Even in a model that includes state fixed-effects, estimates of Equation (1) will be biased if 
unobservable, time-varying factors that lead states to change asset rules are also correlated with the 
probability of owning a vehicle in that state. To address this important concern, I also estimate a 
model similar to Equation (1) for a sample including both single mothers and a comparison group 
of single women without children, interacting an indicator for single motherhood with the main 
policy variables and including the single motherhood indicator as an explanatory variable.  As long 
as the unobservable factors affect single mothers and single women without children similarly, this 
specification captures the effect of the policy changes on assets for single mothers relative to the 
comparison group.  
Although one can follow families over time within panels of the SIPP, the panels are not 
long enough to estimate individual fixed-effects in this context. The 1992 and 1993 SIPP Panels 
only provide asset information in two waves, and both observations in these panels are prior to 
changes in asset restrictions for most states. The 1996 Panel offers up to four observations on assets 
for each family. However, for many families all four observations occur after the state has changed 
the rules for asset restrictions. Thus, I treat the SIPP waves as repeated cross-sections. An important 
concern with this approach is that the composition of who is a single mother may change over time, 
and single motherhood is not completely exogenous to changes in welfare policies; the level of 
welfare benefits and eligibility rules could affect marriage or fertility. However, the consensus in 
                                                          
12 For state wages I take the average weekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing for each state in 
a given year from Moffitt (2002). 
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this literature is that the effect of welfare policies on single motherhood is small (Hoynes 1997). 
Moreover, single motherhood is not likely to change significantly over short time periods. While 
the bulk of my analysis focuses on the period from 1992 to 1999, the results I report below are 
qualitatively similar, and in many cases stronger, for the subsample of single mothers from the pre-
PRWORA period. 
4.  Results 
A.  Vehicle Assets 
 Table 4 shows estimates of Equation (1) for single mothers without a high school degree in 
the SIPP from 1992 through 1999. Consistent with the difference-in-differences results in Table 3, 
the estimates in Table 4 indicate that vehicle exemptions have an important effect on vehicle assets.  
Column 1 shows probit estimates for the effect of asset restrictions on an indicator for vehicle 
ownership.  The probability of owning a vehicle is lower in states that have a limit on vehicle equity 
than in states that exempt vehicles, but this difference decreases as the exemption increases. As a 
test of the effect of a change in vehicle exemptions, I compare a single mother in a state with a 
$1500 vehicle exemption in real terms, which was the limit for most states prior to the waiver 
period, to a single mother in a state with a full vehicle exemption (β1 + (1.5)β2), as was common by 
1999. The estimates in Column 1 suggest that a single mother in a state with a $1500 exemption is 
11.6 percentage points less likely to own a car than a comparable single mother living in a state that 
fully exempts a vehicle (p-value = 0.137). This point estimate is fairly large given that only 43 
percent of these single mothers own vehicles during this time period. Within states that do not fully 
exempt vehicles, each $1000 increase in the exemption results in a 2.1 percentage point increase in 
vehicle ownership rates (p-value = 0.008).13  
                                                          
13 Estimation of a model that includes one-year lags of the asset rules provides no indication of a delayed 
response to these rules changes.  I can reject the hypothesis that vehicle ownership increases with the lagged 
values of the state vehicle exemptions.   
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Asset restrictions may not only affect vehicle ownership but also the value of vehicles that 
families own. For example, families may allow their vehicles to depreciate, or own vehicles of 
lower quality in order to satisfy the asset tests.  For vehicle equity (Columns 2 through 6), I 
estimate quantile regressions in addition to mean regressions because the distribution of vehicle 
equity is highly skewed.14  The results for vehicle equity are consistent with those for vehicle 
ownership. A single mother in a state with a $1500 exemption holds $390 less vehicle equity than a 
comparable single mother living in a state that fully exempts a vehicle (-471+1.5*53.9). This effect 
is marginally significant (p-value = 0.067) and represents a 44 percent change at the mean of 
vehicle equity for this truncated sample.  Similarly, moving from a vehicle exemption of $1500 to a 
full vehicle exemption increases vehicle equity by $342 for a single mother at the 60th percentile of 
the distribution of vehicle equity (p-value = 0.084) and by $595 for a single mother at the 75th 
percentile (p-value = 0.136). These estimates represent 88 percent and 50 percent increases in 
vehicle equity at their respective points in the distribution. The effect of vehicle exemptions is 
slightly greater for the market value of vehicles (Column 7) than for the equity value.15  
As discussed in the previous section, states dramatically overhauled their welfare programs 
after the passage of PRWORA, making it more difficult to precisely characterize the nature of these 
changes.  By contrast, during the pre-PRWORA waiver period, states implemented a more limited 
number of specific changes which are arguably easier to characterize empirically.  For this waiver 
period the effect of vehicle exemptions is somewhat larger (Column 8). The likelihood of owning a 
                                                          
14 For all OLS regressions, I truncate the sample at the top 2.5 percent of the distribution of the dependent 
variable due to extreme outliers in the distribution of assets. I do not estimate median regressions because 
only 45 percent of these single mothers have nonzero vehicle equity.  For the quantile estimates, I report 
bootstrapped standard errors that allow for within state dependence by resampling at the state level, taking all 
observations for a given state, rather than at the state-year level. These bootstrap standard errors are estimated 
using 200 replications. In general, this resampling procedure significantly increases the magnitude of the 
standard errors for the quantile regressions. 
15 Although assessing the market value of vehicles for the asset test has become more common, most states 
still assess the equity value.  (See notes to Table 1).  Including an indicator for whether a state assesses the 
market value or equity value of a vehicle (1 = market value) has virtually no effect on the results reported 
above; the coefficient on this indicator variable is positive, but not significant.  Also, excluding from the 
sample single women living in state-years where the market value of vehicles is assessed does not change the 
results presented in Tables 4 through 7. 
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car for a single mother in a state with a $1500 exemption is 26.2 percentage points lower than the 
likelihood for a single mother in a state with a full exemption (-0.274 + 1.5*0.008) and this 
response is statistically significant (p-value = 0.016). For this pre-PRWORA period, I also find that 
vehicle equity and market value respond significantly to changes in vehicle exemptions (results not 
reported).  As discussed in Section 2, Welfare participation rates were much lower post-PRWORA 
than during the waiver period.  This suggests that the response should be larger prior to PRWORA; 
as the probability of participating in welfare falls, single mothers should be less likely to respond to 
changes in welfare rules.   
Unlike the results for vehicle exemptions, there is little evidence that the limits on total 
assets have any effect on vehicle assets. The estimates for both the direct effect of the value of the 
liquid asset limit as well as the effect of this value interacted with the maximum benefit are very 
small. Incorporating this interaction term, I consider the effect of the asset limit for a state with a 
real maximum benefit of $380—the average maximum benefit for this sample of single mothers 
across all states during this time period. Thus, my null hypothesis for the effect of the asset limit is 
β3 + 3.8β4 = 0. The effect of this policy change is not economically significant in any of the 
specifications in Table 4. The estimate of the effect of the asset limit on vehicle ownership (Column 
1), for example, is -0.1 percentage points (-0.003 + 3.8*0.001).  
The point estimates for the coefficients on other explanatory variables show that race and 
whether the family lives in a rural area are important predictors of vehicle ownership, while the 
effect of welfare generosity is small and not statistically significant.  As discussed in Section 3B, 
included in all of these specifications are controls for other state-level changes in AFDC/TANF 
policy.  In most cases, the point estimates on these policy variables are positive suggesting that 
vehicle assets are higher in states that have implemented a time limit or terminated cases under new 
welfare rules.  However, the effects are generally small and the standard errors on these estimates 
are large.  
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As mentioned in Section 3B, the analysis presented in Table 4 may be biased if 
unobservable, time-varying factors that lead states to change asset rules are also correlated with the 
probability of owning a vehicle or holding vehicle equity.  To address this, I estimate the effect of 
asset restrictions on vehicle assets for single mothers relative to a group of single women without 
children.  The results for these relative effects of changes in asset restrictions are presented in Table 
5. These results are quite similar to those presented in Table 4, although the results for vehicle 
equity are somewhat less precise.  Again, we see evidence that more generous vehicle exemptions 
result in greater vehicle ownership, but that the asset limit has no effect.16 For example, the 
difference in vehicle ownership rates between those in states with a full vehicle exemption and 
those in states with a $1500 exemption is 20 percentage points greater in absolute value for single 
mothers than for single women without children (-0.237+1.5*0.025), and this effect is statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.022). The results also show that moving to a full vehicle exemption 
increases vehicle equity in relative terms by $565 (p-value = 0.090). The quantile estimates for the 
effect of vehicle exemptions on vehicle equity are similar to those reported in Table 4, although the 
standard errors are larger. The relative effect of vehicle exemptions on the market value of vehicles 
is large (β1 + (1.5)β2 = -1011) and statistically significant. Also, the effects are still evident, and 
larger, for the pre-PRWORA sample period.  
The results in Table 5 suggest that a policy that fully exempts vehicles would lead to 
approximately a $565 increase in average vehicle equity, which, holding other components of the 
asset portfolio fixed, implies a 28 percent increase in non-housing wealth for single mothers 
without a high school degree.  However, non-housing wealth may not increase if these women are 
substituting vehicle equity for other assets that are not exempt for the AFDC/TANF asset test.  
Previous research has shown that other policies aimed at encouraging saving have had strong 
                                                          
16 For single women without children, I assign a maximum benefit equal to the AFDC/TANF maximum for a 
family of two in each state. Consequently, for this sample of all single women the average state maximum 
AFDC/TANF benefit level is about $300. Thus, to consider the effect of asset limits for this sample I test the 
hypothesis that β3 + (3.0)β4 = 0. 
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effects on the allocation of assets but little effect on the level of saving (Engen, Gale, and Scholz 
1996).  To address this concern, the following section considers whether other assets also respond 
to changes in asset restrictions. 
B.  Liquid Assets and Wealth 
To determine the effect of recent policy changes on non-housing wealth and the allocation 
of assets, I also consider whether changes in asset restrictions affect the holdings of liquid assets.  
There is some disagreement in the previous literature over the effect of liquid asset limits.  While 
Hurst and Ziliak (Forthcoming) find that liquid assets do not respond to the recent changes in the 
limit on total assets, Powers (1998) reports a sizeable response to changes stemming from OBRA 
81.  The theoretical predictions for the effect of vehicle exemptions on liquid asset holdings are not 
clear. On the one hand, relaxing the vehicle exemption may encourage families to substitute vehicle 
equity for liquid assets in response to the more generous exemption. Also, more generous vehicle 
exemptions may make welfare more attractive to some families, encouraging them to hold fewer 
liquid assets for precautionary reasons. On the other hand, if the exemption is initially binding to 
the extent that some vehicle equity is counted towards the limit on total assets, then relaxed 
exemptions provide more room for liquid assets under the asset test, allowing families to increase 
liquid asset holdings.  
Following the approach taken for vehicle assets, I examine the effect of changes in asset 
limits and vehicle exemptions on liquid asset holdings and non-housing wealth by re-estimating 
Equation (1), substituting a measure of liquid assets or non-housing wealth as the dependent 
variable.17 I estimate OLS models and quantile regressions for liquid assets and wealth as well 
probit models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the family has any 
liquid assets.  The results for single mothers without a high school degree in Table 6 suggest that 
families are not substituting out of liquid assets into vehicle equity in response to more generous 
                                                          
17 Liquid assets include money in checking and savings accounts, savings bonds, stocks, and other financial 
investments.  Wealth includes all liquid assets and vehicle equity, but excludes real estate assets.  
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vehicle exemptions. In fact, the sign of β1 + (1.5)β2 is negative in most cases, suggesting that liquid 
assets increase with more generous exemptions. Although the estimates are somewhat imprecise, in 
most cases I can reject the hypothesis that liquid assets or wealth fall significantly as vehicle 
exemptions become more generous. The findings suggest that a single mother in a state with a 
$1500 vehicle exemption is 18.2 percentage points less likely to have any liquid assets than a 
comparable single mother living in a state with a full vehicle exemption (p-value = 0.002; Column 
1).  The analogous result for single mothers relative to the comparison group is very similar 
(Column 6).  The OLS estimates (Column 2) suggest that the level of liquid assets increases by 
$196 in response to more generous exemptions (p-value = 0.034). However, the estimates for the 
effect of vehicle exemptions from quantile regressions at the 75th percentile of liquid assets are 
small and indistinguishable from zero (Column 3).  Evidence on non-housing wealth holdings 
(Columns 4, 5, 9, and 10), which include both liquid and vehicle assets, is consistent with the 
findings for the components of wealth. The response of total wealth to more generous vehicle 
exemptions is similar in magnitude to the response of vehicle assets, suggesting much of the change 
in wealth is due to a change in vehicle assets.  While the standard errors for these regressions for 
non-housing wealth are large, in some cases I can reject the hypothesis that wealth falls in response 
to a policy that exempts vehicle equity (Column 9). Point estimates from median regressions are 
consistent with those from OLS, but are smaller in absolute value. 
Table 6 also provides evidence on the effect of the asset limit on the holdings of liquid 
assets and non-housing wealth. These estimates show virtually no evidence that increases in the 
asset limit increase the liquid asset holdings of single mothers either in a statistical or economic 
sense. The point estimates for the effect of a $1000 increase in the asset limit for a single mother 
without a high school degree in a state with an average maximum welfare benefit are negative in all 
specifications. Also, in many of the specifications I can reject the null hypothesis that liquid assets 
increase in response to changes in the asset limit, and in all cases I can reject that liquid assets 
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increase by an economically significant amount. These findings are consistent with Hurst and Ziliak 
(Forthcoming), who also find no effect of the asset limit on liquid assets for single mothers. The 
results also suggest that the asset limit has no effect on total non-housing wealth (Columns 4, 5, 9, 
10)—in all cases the estimated effect is negative, and in most cases I can reject the hypothesis that 
wealth increases with these limits.  
If liquid assets do not fall, how do single mothers finance increases in vehicle assets? 
During the 1990s both disposable income and total consumption increased for many single mothers 
(Meyer and Sullivan 2005).  In addition, some of the increase in vehicle spending may have been 
financed by a decrease in spending on other components of consumption.  Data on expenditures 
from the Consumer Expenditure (CE) Survey for the 1992-1999 period show that vehicle spending 
as a share of total expenditures for low-educated single mothers has grown both in absolute terms 
and relative to single women without children.   
C.  Other Samples and Robustness Checks 
Results for both vehicle and liquid assets for other samples that include single mothers with 
a high school degree are reported in Table 7.  In general, these results are similar to those reported 
for those without a high school degree, although the magnitudes of the effects are smaller in 
percentage terms.  One might expect the effects to be smaller for this sample, because single 
mothers with a high school degree have a lower probability of participating in welfare than those 
that do not graduate high school, and therefore they are less likely to respond to changes in welfare 
policy.  For the sample of only single mothers with a high school degree there is very little response 
of vehicle ownership to vehicle limits either in absolute terms or relative to single women without 
children.  Estimates for vehicle equity and market value (not reported) also indicate that vehicle 
assets are less responsive to vehicle limits for this group.  For the combined sample of single 
women with a high school degree or less, there is some evidence that vehicle ownership responds to 
limits.  Moving from a $1500 vehicle exemption to a full vehicle exemption increases the 
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probability of owning a car by 8.9 percentage points for single mothers relative to single women 
without children (p-value = 0.076).  Again, we see that more generous vehicle limits do not result in 
a reduction in liquid asset holdings.  In addition, consistent with the earlier results, all of the 
specifications in Table 7 show virtually no evidence that more generous limits on total assets result 
in greater vehicle or liquid assets.  
One potential concern with the results for vehicle assets reported thus far is that the states 
that become more aggressive about requiring welfare recipients to work may also relax vehicle 
exemptions.  In this case, the increased emphasis on work, rather than more generous vehicle 
exemptions, leads to greater vehicle ownership.  The results presented above control for this if the 
other welfare policy variables included in Equation (1) capture the heterogeneity in state welfare 
reforms that may affect demand for vehicles.  The results are not sensitive to the precise 
characterization of these policy variables.  The results do not change, for example, when other 
policy variables are included such as indicators for the implementation of a state work requirement 
or an indicator for the implementation of full-family sanctions for failing to comply with work 
requirements.  
The findings reported in Tables 4 through 7 are robust to a variety of other specifications, 
sample restrictions, and estimation techniques. For example, I verify that the results hold for a 
sample that excludes low-educated single mothers who own a home (15 percent of the sample).  
Also, the results are qualitatively similar for a variety of quantile regressions.  I also consider the 
effects for a sample of single women with less than a college degree, which is the sample used in 
previous studies on asset restrictions. My results for this larger sample are similar to those reported 
in Table 7 for single women with a high school degree or less, although the point estimates for the 
larger sample are slightly smaller in absolute value.  
The OLS results presented earlier are fairly sensitive to outliers.  While truncation does not 
change any of the signs of the point estimates for the coefficients on the policy variables, the 
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parameter estimates for these truncated samples tend to be smaller than those for the full sample.  
To test the robustness of the OLS results, I estimate a tobit model of the effect of asset restrictions 
on asset holdings, assuming the dependent variable is censored at zero. These models address the 
fact that desired assets may be negative. Estimates from these tobit models for vehicle equity, liquid 
assets, or wealth are similar to those reported for OLS.  I also considered how asset restrictions 
affect a variety of other outcomes that reflect the saving behavior of poor families. In general, I find 
that asset restrictions have little impact on debt—either vehicle debt or other non-housing debt. This 
is not surprising given that very few low-educated single mothers have substantial amounts of 
consumer debt (Sullivan 2005). Also, the results for non-housing net worth are consistent with 
those reported for non-housing wealth above.  In addition, I verify that asset limits in the Food 
Stamps program do not affect the baseline results presented here.18  
With panel data, one could examine whether households that initially appear constrained by 
the vehicle limits are the ones that respond to more generous limits. Unfortunately, as explained in 
Section 3B, there are limitations with using the panel data in the context of this study.  However, 
analysis that exploits the longer 1996 SIPP panel provides some evidence that these limits may be 
binding constraints initially.  For example, nearly a quarter of all vehicles purchased by low-
educated single mothers living in states that have relaxed the vehicle exemption within the past two 
years have equity values that exceed the old limit but fall below the new limit.   
Given the panel nature of the SIPP, nonrandom attrition is a potential source of bias.  This 
is a particular concern if the holdings of vehicle or liquid assets differ noticeably for attritors and 
nonattritors.  A comparison of demographic characteristics for those in the first wave of each panel 
                                                          
18 Throughout this sample period the Food Stamps asset limit was fixed at the federal level at $2000 for non-
elderly households and the vehicle exemption was fixed at $4650.  However, as AFDC/TANF asset 
restrictions were relaxed, the Food Stamps limit may have become the effective limit in some states for 
households potentially eligible for both programs.  To allow for possible interactions with the Food Stamps 
program, I substitute the effective asset and vehicle limits—the minimum of each limit across the two 
programs in each state-year—for the baseline measures of asset restrictions in Equation (1).  These results 
indicate that an increase in the effective vehicle exemption by $1000 increases vehicle ownership by 3.5 
percentage points (p-value = 0.021), which is similar to estimates of β2 in Table 4.  The effect of the effective 
asset limit is not distinguishable from zero. 
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shows that single mothers that subsequently attrit are very similar to those who do not attrit.  While 
the attritors are slightly less educated, are less likely to own a home, and have smaller families, only 
the difference in family size is statistically significant.  These differences are consistent with those 
reported for earlier SIPP panels (Zabel 1998).  Furthermore, estimates of Equation (1) for a sample 
of low-educated single mothers from only the first wave of each panel yields results that are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 4 through 7.  
D.  Assets Restrictions and Commuting to Work 
 As discussed in Section 2B, in addition to accounting for a substantial fraction of total 
assets for low-educated single mothers, vehicles are a particularly important outcome to examine in 
light of recent reforms to welfare that require recipients to work in order to maintain eligibility. 
Previous studies have suggested that access to adequate transportation is critical for stable 
employment of welfare recipients. Recent research that examines the effect of owning a vehicle 
finds that car ownership increases both the probability of being employed as well as work hours 
(Bansak, Mattson, and Rice 2004). 
The 1996 SIPP panel provides some limited information on commuting for workers. Using 
these data, I can test the hypothesis that changes in AFDC/TANF asset restrictions affect how 
single mothers commute to work by examining whether these policy changes had an effect on the 
likelihood that a single mother drives to work. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I can only 
examine the effect of asset restrictions on driving to work for the post-PRWORA period.19 In 
general, these results show some evidence that more generous vehicle exemptions increase the 
likelihood that a single mother drives to work, but the results are imprecise. As shown in Table 8, 
there is some evidence that relaxing vehicle exemptions increases the probability that a single 
mother drives to work. A working single mother in a state with a $1500 vehicle exemption is 16.9 
percentage points less likely to drive her own car to work than a comparable single mother living in 
                                                          




a state without a limit on vehicles (p-value = 0.158). The response for the larger sample of single 
mothers with a high school degree or less is smaller but statistically significant (p-value = 0.048). 
Comparing single mothers to single women without children, there is still some indication that 
vehicle exemptions affect whether a single mother drives to work, but these effects are smaller and 
not statistically significant. There is little evidence that more generous asset limits increase the 
likelihood that a single mother drives to work.  
5. Conclusions 
This study examines whether recent changes in asset restrictions for the AFDC/TANF 
program have an impact on the asset holdings of low-educated single mother families.  There are 
important reasons to focus on vehicle assets within the context of a study of the saving behavior of 
the poor.  Recent policy changes for vehicle exemptions far exceed the changes for asset limits.  
These changes may affect not only vehicle asset holdings, but also asset allocation.  Also, vehicles 
are the single largest component of wealth for low-educated single mother families.  While vehicles 
are somewhat illiquid, researchers have argued that durable are an important saving mechanism for 
families with limited exposure to financial institutions.  In addition, vehicles are an important 
consumption good, particularly for welfare recipients transitioning into the labor force.  
Consistent with Hurst and Ziliak (Forthcoming), who argue that asset restrictions do not 
have an important effect on the saving behavior of the poor, I find little evidence that the limit on 
assets discourages asset accumulation for single mother families. This suggests that while asset 
limits may, in theory, discourage saving for some families, as suggested by Hubbard, Skinner, and 
Zeldes (1995), these limits do not appear to be binding for families most likely to participate in 
welfare. However, unlike previous research, I show that exemptions for vehicle equity do have an 
important effect on vehicle assets. The findings suggest that moving from a $1500 vehicle 
exemption to a full vehicle exemption increases the probability of owning a car by 20 percentage 
points for low-educated single mothers relative to a comparison group—an economically and 
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statistically significant response. However, the response of vehicle ownership to an incremental, 
$1000 change in the vehicle exemption is small. The evidence also suggests that more generous 
vehicle exemptions result in greater vehicle equity. For this low-educated sample, moving to a full 
vehicle exemption increases average vehicle equity by about $565. These findings hold across a 
wide variety of specifications.  The results are even stronger for a sample from the waiver period 
prior to the passage of PRWORA.  Also, single mothers without a high school degree are more 
responsive to the policy changes than more educated single mothers. 
The evidence presented here also suggests that more generous vehicle exemptions do not 
decrease liquid asset holdings and that total non-housing wealth increases, suggesting that single 
mothers are not substituting out of liquid assets in response to more relaxed restrictions on vehicles.  
In addition, I present some evidence that more generous vehicle exemptions increase the probability 
that working single mothers drive to work. 
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Notes : Asset data are from the SIPP Panels 1992 (wave 4), 1993 (wave 7) and 1996 (waves 3, 6, 9 and 12).
Non-housing wealth includes checking & savings accounts, savings bonds, stocks, other financial investments,
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Single Mothers with a High
School Degree or Less
Single Mothers without a
High School Degree
Figure 1
Fraction with Positive Values for Selected Assets, Single Women 
Asset Limit Vehicle Exemption  
Maximum Monthly 
AFDC/TANF Benefit
1992 1996 1999 1992 1996 1999 1992 1996 1999
Alabama 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,500 exempt exempt 164 164 164
Alaska 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 923 923 923
Arizona 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 347 347 347
Arkansas 1,000 1,000 3,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 204 204 204
California 1,000 2,000 2,000 1,500 4,500 4,650 633 596 626
Colorado 1,000 2,000 2,000 1,500 exempt exempt 356 356 356
Connecticut 1,000 3,000 3,000 1,500 exempt exempt 680 636 636
Delaware 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 4,650 4,650 338 338 338
District of Columbia 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 4,650* 409 415 379
Florida 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 8,500 303 303 303
Georgia 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 4,650* 4,650* 280 280 280
Hawaii 1,000 1,000 5,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 693 712 570
Idaho 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 4,650* 315 317 293
Illinois 1,000 3,000 3,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 367 377 377
Indiana 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,000 1,000 5,000 288 288 288
Iowa 1,000 5,000 5,000 1,500 3,000 3,889 426 426 426
Kansas 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 403 429 429
Kentucky 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 228 262 262
Louisiana 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,200 1,200 10,000 190 190 190
Maine 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 exempt exempt 453 418 450
Maryland 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 377 373 417
Massachusetts 1,000 2,500 2,500 1,500 5,000* 5,000* 579 579 565
Michigan 1,000 1,000 3,000 1,500 exempt exempt 459 459 459
Minnesota 1,000 1,750 5,000 1,500 1,500 7,500 532 532 532
Mississippi 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 4,650* 120 120 145
Missouri 1,000 5,000 5,000 1,500 exempt exempt 292 292 292
Nebraska 1,000 5,000 6,000 1,500 exempt exempt 364 364 364
New Hampshire 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 516 550 575
New Jersey 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 9,500* 424 424 424
New Mexico 1,000 1,000 3,500 1,500 1,500 exempt 324 389 439
New York 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 4,650* 577 577 577
North Carolina 1,000 3,000 3,000 1,500 5,000* exempt 272 272 272
Ohio 1,000 1,000 exempt 1,500 4,600* exempt 334 341 373
Oklahoma 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 5,000 5,000 324 307 292
Oregon 1,000 2,500 2,500 1,500 9,000 10,000 460 460 460
Pennsylvania 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 421 421 421
South Carolina 1,000 1,000 2,500 1,500 1,500 10,000* 200 200 204
Tennessee 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 4,600 185 185 185
Texas 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 4,600* 4,650* 184 188 201
Utah 1,000 2,000 2,000 1,500 8,000 8,000 402 426 451
Virginia 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 7,500* 7,500* 354 354 354
Washington 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,500 1,500 5,000 531 546 546
West Virginia 1,000 1,000 2,000 1,500 1,500 exempt 249 253 328
Wisconsin 1,000 1,000 2,500 1,500 2,500 10,000 518 517 673
Table 1--State Asset Rules and Benefit Amounts for the AFDC/TANF Program, 1992-1999
Notes : Limits and exemptions reflect the restrictions that apply to the majority of the recipients in a given state in
that year. All limits refer to the equity value except those with a "*" which denotes that the limit applies to the
market value. Many states offer exceptions to these rules for some families. For example, some states exempt
vehicles if used to transport disabled family members or for commuting for work or training. All numbers reported
here are in nominal terms, but these state rules are converted to constant 1996 dollars for the empirical analysis.
Maximum benefits are for a family of three (a parent with 2 children).
Source : Asset Limits and Vehicle Exemptions: Urban Institute (2002), HHS (Various Years); Maximum benefit:
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (Various
Years).  






School Degree  
High School 
Degree or Less
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No High School Degree 1.000 0.363 1.000 0.238
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.008)
Age 33.19 33.42 42.75 40.24
(0.201) (0.112) (0.344) (0.189)
Family Size 3.389 3.076 1.000 1.000
(0.030) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
Race (White=1) 0.604 0.611 0.697 0.780
(0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007)
Fraction Owning Vehicles 0.428 0.582 0.548 0.729
(0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.008)
0.600 0.728 0.660 0.780
(0.021) (0.010) (0.027) (0.011)
Vehicle Equity 1,153 1,862 1,806 2,936
(65.8) (50.3) (125.0) (77.1)
2,692 3,197 3,293 4,026
(132.3) (76.5) (205.9) (96.6)
Vehicle Market Value 2,057 3,355 2,958 4,768
(98.0) (74.2) (174) (105.5)
4,802 5,760 5,394 6,538
(184.4) (106.3) (270) (127)
Liquid Assets 861 2,161 2,158 6,425
(132.2) (139.4) (342) (307)
Non-Housing Wealth 2,014 4,023 3,964 9,362
(156) (159.8) (374) (330)
Vehicle Equity
50th Percentile 0 490 474 1,470
75th Percentile 1,196 2,842 2,450 4,650
90th Percentile 3,920 5,845 5,730 8,173
Liquid Assets
50th Percentile 0 0 0 291
75th Percentile 13 344 290 3,332
90th Percentile 870 2,661 3,792 17,330
Non-Housing Wealth
50th Percentile 0 751 711 3,280
75th Percentile 1,764 3,889 3,915 9,226
90th Percentile 5,486 9,300 10,870 23,436
N 1,837 5,153 792 3,148
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics, Single Women, Ages 18-54, 1992-1999, SIPP
Notes : Statistics are means unless reported otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. Data are
from the following SIPP panels: 1992 (waves 4 and 7), 1993 (waves 4 and 7), and 1996 (waves 3, 6,
9, and 12). Vehicles include all cars, vans, and light trucks, excluding recreational vehicles (RV's) and
motorcycles. Liquid assets include checking and savings accounts, savings bonds, stocks, and other
financial investments. Unlike Figures 1-3, non-housing wealth here does not include business equity
or IRAs, because these data are not reported in some waves.  Dollar values are in 1996 dollars.  
a. Transportation data are only available in the 1996 panel. See Table 8 for sample sizes for this
variable.
Vehicle Market Value for those 
with Vehicles
Vehicle Equity for those with 
Vehicles
Fraction of Workers who Drive 
to Worka
















or Ratio (3) - (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No High School Degree
Fraction Owning a Vehicle 0.379 0.484 0.105* 0.538 0.559 0.021 0.084*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.036) (0.043)
Equity Value of Vehicles 1,001 1,326 1.325* 1,714 1,896 1.106 0.219
(82.3) (102) (0.149) (174.3) (178) (0.153) (0.214)
Market Value of Vehicles 1,682 2,481 1.475* 2,877 3,038 1.056 0.419*
(133) (143) (0.144) (267.2) (230) (0.126) (0.192)
Liquid Assets 876 946 1.079 2,497 2,176 0.871 0.208
(236) (202) (0.371) (689) (517) (0.317) (0.488)
N 823 1,014 322 470
High School Degree or Less
Fraction Owning a Vehicle 0.549 0.620 0.071* 0.727 0.732 0.005 0.066*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021)
Equity Value of Vehicles 1,885 1,836 0.974 3,046 2,816 0.925 0.049
(69.8) (72.6) (0.053) (113.7) (105.3) (0.049) (0.072)
Market Value of Vehicles 3,139 3,599 1.147* 4,688 4,856 1.036 0.111
(111) (98.9) (0.051) (159) (141) (0.046) (0.069)
Liquid Assets 2,411 2,575 1.068 7,977 7,911 0.992 0.076
(291) (309) (0.182) (861) (674) (0.136) (0.227)
N 2,353 2,800 1,399 1,749
Notes : The “Pre Exemption Change” sample includes single women living in state-years where the nominal vehicle
exemption is still $1500. The “Post Exemption Change” sample includes single women living in state-years where the
vehicle exemption is greater than $1500.  * denotes significance at the 5% level.  See notes to Table 2.
Table 3
Vehicle Assets and Liquid Assets Before and After Changes in State Vehicle Exemptions, Single 
Women, Ages 18-54, 1992-1999
Single Women without Children


























Sample Years All All All All All All All 1992-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State Has Vehicle Limit (1 = Yes) (β1) -0.147 -471 -379 -872 -0.814 -0.536 -597 -0.274
(0.082) (222) (211) (489) (0.912) (0.755) (337) (0.110)
Has Vehicle Limit*Value of Limit (1000s)  (β2) 0.021 53.9 24.3 184.5 0.098 0.106 12.5 0.008
(0.008) (24.8) (25.4) (101) (0.103) (0.095) (42.0) (0.016)
Asset Limit (1000s)  (β3) -0.003 -7.90 -0.49 12.3 0.075 -0.002 11.33 0.027
(0.001) (4.82) (259) (448) (0.584) (0.447) (7.98) (0.073)
Maximum AFDC/TANF Benefit (100s) -0.018 33.5 64.7 140 0.182 -0.259 276 0.014
(0.038) (79.3) (100) (277) (0.428) (0.485) (195) (0.059)
Asset Limit*Maximum Benefit  (β4) 0.001 -0.75 -1.90 -5.04 -0.026 -0.008 -5.64 -0.005
(0.000) (1.13) (34.9) (77.3) (0.115) (0.093) (1.87) (0.015)
Race (White = 1) 0.280 566 461 916 5.227 3.439 996 0.315
(0.034) (114) (34.4) (71.1) (0.100) (0.238) (176) (0.042)
Rural (Rural = 1) 0.134 51.2 217 217 0.622 0.684 241 0.145
(0.044) (142) (44.1) (93.9) (0.131) (0.308) (273) (0.054)
Time Limit Implemented 0.009 287 127 305 0.3186 0.246 229 -0.142
(0.071) (206) (66.8) (143) (0.196) (0.466) (304) (0.081)
Case Terminated 0.073 69.1 66.4 308 0.040 0.949 209 0.300
(0.065) (249) (79.7) (173) (0.236) (0.563) (428) (0.196)
β1 + (1.5)β2 -0.116 -390.2 -342.4 -595.4 -0.667 -0.377 -578.8 -0.262
β3 + (3.8)β4 0.001 -10.77 -7.704 -6.854 -0.023 -0.032 -10.10 0.008
P-values from tests of linear restrictions:
H0: β1 + (1.5)β2 = 0 0.137 0.067 0.084 0.136 0.413 0.586 0.074 0.016
H0: β3 + (3.8)β4 = 0 0.108 0.000 0.957 0.972 0.943 0.911 0.023 0.799
N 1,837 1,791 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,791 1,006
a.  Reported point estimates for the probit models are average derivatives. 
b.  In OLS models, I truncate the sample at the top 2.5 percent of the distribution of the dependent variable.
Table 4
Probit, OLS, and Quantile Estimates of the Effect of Asset Restrictions on Vehicle Ownership and Vehicle Equity, Single 
Mothers, No High School Degree, Ages 18-54, 1992-1999, SIPP
Notes : "FMV" is the fair market value of a vehicle. In addition to the variables listed, all models include a full set of state and year dummies, a cubic in
the age of the female head, family size, and several state level variables including the quarterly unemployment rate and average weekly earnings in the
state. See the text for more details. All dollar values are in real terms (1996 $). The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent
and corrected for dependence within a state.


























Sample Years All All All All All All All 1992-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Single Mother*State Has Vehicle Limit (1 = Yes) (β1) -0.237 -617 -586 -970 -1.544 -0.844 -1007 -0.524
(0.092) (373) (643) (957) (0.847) (0.872) (580) (0.159)
Single Mother*Has Vehicle Limit*Value of Limit (1000s)  (β2) 0.025 34.85 29.18 36.63 0.171 0.033 -2.53 0.024
(0.018) (92.4) (136.4) (268) (0.149) (0.197) (118.0) (0.045)
Single Mother*Asset Limit (1000s)  (β3) 0.058 -29.6 267 828 0.666 -0.176 -113.0 0.193
(0.082) (414) (770.2) (936) (0.844) (0.898) (448) (0.098)
Single Mother*Maximum AFDC/TANF Benefit (100s) 0.066 -8.72 326 813 0.947 0.034 -297 0.208
(0.078) (346) (529) (805) (0.728) (0.871) (455) (0.106)
Single Mother*Asset Limit*Maximum Benefit  (β4) -0.028 7.55 -126 -412 -0.309 0.072 49.87 -0.107
(0.039) (199) (320.0) (468) (0.376) (0.438) (215.0) (0.075)
State Has Vehicle Limit (1 = Yes) 0.092 271 426 425 1.143 0.155 364.1 0.288
(0.090) (353) (641) (1023) (0.955) (0.940) (547) (0.134)
Has Vehicle Limit*Value of Limit (1000s) -0.003 24.6 -10.96 108 -0.119 0.128 30.8 -0.02
(0.018) (96.6) (127.5) (270) (0.156) (0.209) (109.6) (0.041)
Asset Limit (1000s) -0.063 18.4 -266 -818 -0.616 0.159 117 -0.157
(0.082) (415) (692) (881) (0.727) (0.869) (450) (0.087)
Maximum AFDC/TANF Benefit (100s) -0.101 44.6 -299 -617 -1.122 -0.183 586 -0.217
(0.084) (383) (684) (876) (0.772) (0.993) (539) (0.125)
Asset Limit*Maximum Benefit 0.029 -7.63 125 407 0.289 -0.075 -54.98 0.102
(0.039) (199) (311) (459) (0.358) (0.450) (215) (0.075)
β1 + (1.5)β2 -0.200 -564.6 -542.6 -915.5 -1.288 -0.795 -1011 -0.488
β3 + (3.0)β4 -0.026 -6.98 -111.4 -406.4 -0.261 0.040 36.56 -0.128
P-values from tests of linear restrictions:
H0: β1 + (1.5)β2 = 0 0.022 0.090 0.296 0.221 0.079 0.244 0.041 0.002
H0: β3 + (3.0)β4 = 0 0.476 0.970 0.768 0.479 0.567 0.999 0.837 0.391
N 2,629 2,563 2,629 2,629 2,629 2,629 2,563 1,389
Table 5
Probit, OLS, and Quantile Estimates of the Effect of Asset Restrictions on Vehicle Ownership and Vehicle Equity, Single Mothers 
Relative to Single Women without Children, No High School Degree, Ages 18-54, 1992-1999, SIPP
Notes : Models also include an indicator for single mother families as well as the variables listed in Table 4.
Single Mothers Single Women
Dependent Variable Indicator 



































Sample Years All All All All All All All All All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
State Has Vehicle Limit (1 = Yes) (β1) -0.209 -222 -23.5 -505 -224 -0.208 -736 -197 -910 -740
(0.068) (97) (78.9) (472) (155) (0.073) (268) (292) (596) (684)
Has Vehicle Limit*Value of Limit (1000s)  (β2) 0.018 17.4 2.31 70 21.4 0.008 69.2 29.6 -44.4 98.5
(0.007) (11.0) (9.63) (46.0) (29.3) (0.011) (57.0) (22.7) (117.2) (121)
Asset Limit (1000s)  (β3) -0.076 -78.5 -1.55 -200.6 -40.8 0.051 546 216 709 492
(0.023) (36.4) (46.8) (128) (99.2) (0.066) (302) (204) (589) (1092)
Asset Limit*Maximum Benefit  (β4) 0.02 12.0 0.37 30.71 3.47 -0.043 -311 -130 -462 -262
(0.006) (8.88) (5.75) (33.5) (21.8) (0.031) (145) (118) (275) (410)
β1 + (1.5)β2 -0.182 -196.3 -20.05 -400.3 -191.6 -0.196 -631.9 -152.8 -976.6 -591.7
β3 + (3.8)β4 -0.015 -32.91 -0.132 -83.92 -27.60 - - - - -
β3 + (3.0)β4 - - - - - -0.078 -385.6 -174.3 -677.5 -292.4
P-values from tests of linear restrictions:
H0: β1 + (1.5)β2 = 0 0.002 0.034 0.782 0.358 0.140 0.002 0.006 0.595 0.064 0.410
H0: β3 + (3.8)β4 = 0 0.006 0.019 0.997 0.039 0.912 - - - - -
H0: β3 + (3.0)β4 = 0 - - - - - 0.011 0.011 0.336 0.016 0.459
N 1,837 1,791 1,837 1,791 1,837 2,629 2,563 2,629 2,563 2,629
Table 6
Probit, OLS, and Quantile Estimates of the Effect of Asset Restrictions on Liquid Assets and Non-Housing Wealth, Single 
Women, No High School Degree, Ages 18-54, 1992-1999, SIPP
Notes : The coefficients reported in columns (6) through (10) are for the interaction of the variables listed above and an indicator for single mother families.
See Tables 4 and 5 for the list of other variables included in these specifications. 
Single Mothers Single Women
High School Degree 
Only
High School Degree 
or Less
High School Degree 
Only
High School Degree 
or Less
















Model Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
Sample Years All All All All All All All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State Has Vehicle Limit (1 = Yes) (β1) -0.031 99.8 -0.059 6.53 -0.063 -89.8 -0.114 -460
(0.035) (113) (0.037) (117) (0.052) (223.4) (0.052) (239)
Has Vehicle Limit*Value of Limit (1000s)  (β2) 0.001 8.66 0.008 7.70 0.011 7.66 0.017 20.9
(0.007) (14.1) (0.006) (14.9) (0.009) (53.2) (0.010) (38)
Asset Limit (1000s)  (β3) -0.005 -40.0 -0.006 -36.5 0.025 645.1 0.040 543
(0.001) (35.8) (0.001) (34.8) (0.072) (266.1) (0.052) (210)
Asset Limit*Maximum Benefit  (β4) 0.000 10.77 0.001 7.5 -0.012 -336.4 -0.020 -300
(0.000) (10.1) (0.000) (8.6) (0.035) (126.4) (0.025) (96)
β1 + (1.5)β2 -0.030 112.8 -0.047 18.086 -0.047 -78.3 -0.089 -429.1
β3 + (3.8)β4 -0.005 0.907 -0.002 -7.904 - - - -
β3 + (3.0)β4 - - - - -0.011 -364.1 -0.020 -355.2
P-values from tests of linear restrictions:
H0: β1 + (1.5)β2 = 0 0.363 0.263 0.187 0.864 0.352 0.693 0.076 0.054
H0: β3 + (3.8)β4 = 0 0.000 0.915 0.000 0.420 - - - -
H0: β3 + (3.0)β4 = 0 - - - - 0.703 0.007 0.404 0.000
N 3,316 3,233 5,153 5,024 5,672 5,530 8,301 8,093
Table 7
Probit and OLS Estimates of the Effect of Asset Restrictions on Vehicle Assets, Liquid Assets, and Non-Housing 
Wealth, Single Women, Ages 18-54, 1992-1999, SIPP
Notes : See notes to Tables 4 and 6. 
Dependent Variable 1 = Drive to Work















(1) (2) (3) (4)
State Has Vehicle Limit (1 = Yes) (β1) -0.184 -0.083 -0.086 -0.055
(0.117) (0.044) (0.140) (0.055)
Has Vehicle Limit*Value of Limit (1000s)  (β2) 0.01 0.002 -0.011 0.005
(0.014) (0.006) (0.024) (0.009)
Asset Limit (1000s)  (β3) 0.00 0.003 -0.077 0.142
(0.003) (0.001) (0.193) (0.045)
Asset Limit*Maximum Benefit  (β4) 0.00 -0.001 0.039 -0.066
(0.001) (0.000) (0.093) (0.021)
β1 + (1.5)β2 -0.169 -0.080 -0.103 -0.048
β3 + (3.8)β4 0.000 -0.001 - -
β3 + (3.0)β4 - - 0.040 -0.056
P-values from tests of linear restrictions:
H0: β1 + (1.5)β2 = 0 0.158 0.048 0.407 0.314
H0: β3 + (3.8)β4 = 0 0.214 0.520 - -
H0: β3 + (3.0)β4 = 0 - - 0.651 0.003
Mean of Dependent Variable (Fraction of Sample that Drives) 0.600 0.728 0.618 0.748
N 553 2,163 849 3,583
Table 8
Probit Estimates of the Effect of Asset Restrictions on the Probability of Driving Own Car to 
Work, Single Mothers and Single Women without Children Who Work, Ages 18-54, 1996-
1999, SIPP
Notes : Samples include single women who are working at the time of the survey. Data are from the 1996 Panel
of the SIPP. The coefficients reported in columns (3) and (4) are for the interaction of the variables listed above
and an indicator for single mother families. See notes to Table 4.
